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Abstract:  Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but 
targets‟ ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political 
processes.  The institutionalization of winning coalitions‟ loyalty across regime type follows 
opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types.  Democratic 
leaders‟ coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to 
them then.  As competition and dissatisfaction grows, aid becomes a political liability.  In small 
winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating 
increasing benefits from aid.  Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are 
destabilizing to autocratic leaders.  Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960-2001 using a 
censored probit model supports these expectations.  
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Many foreign policy actions are intended to reward, support or entice cooperation from 
leaders of smaller states.  Such “positive sanctions” include preferential trade agreements, 
military alliance, and development assistance (c.f. Baldwin 1971, 1985).  Indeed, wealthy and 
powerful states proffer these foreign policy carrots on a regular basis, sometimes with blatantly 
strategic aims.  In recent years, for example, the United States has established beneficial 
relationships with many Central Asian and Middle Eastern states, providing aid in return for 
cooperation in the War on Terror.  Even when donor nations hope to achieve more humanitarian 
goals, friendly tactics possess substantial potential to alter the domestic risks of leaders.  Ignoring 
this capacity may obscure a mechanism essential to the ultimate success of cooperative foreign 
policy.    
Survival-driven leaders will weigh the personal benefits/costs generated by foreign policy 
targeting.  A positive sanction which does not translate into a desirable amelioration of domestic 
political risks is not likely to persuade targeted leaders to make the requested changes.  
Investigations of friendly foreign policy, however, usually focus on the ultimate, macro-effects 
such as democratization and economic growth, leaving the potential link to leaders 
understudied.
1
  The current project straddles this gap in our understanding of foreign policy and 
leader survival, studying how the impact of cooperative foreign policy on targeted leaders is 
conditioned both by institutions and political processes.  Foreign aid provides an excellent 
embarkation point for further investigations of the link between foreign policy and leader 
survival; the advanced world invests considerable sums in development assistance, but its 
effectiveness is frequently called into question by empirical studies (Chenery and Strout 1966; 
Regan 1995; Geddes 1994; Kosack and Tobin 2005; Daalgard, Hansen and Tarp 2004; 
Brautigam and Knack 2004).   
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Below I build a theory of foreign aid as a tool of influence the effectiveness of which 
depends upon domestic institutions and political processes, and the targeting of which is not 
random.  If this “positive sanction” (Baldwin 1985) holds the potential to assist targeted leaders 
in their attempts to maintain power, then for two reasons rational donor states‟ aid monies will 
likely be spent on those targets facing higher domestic risk.  First, aid may represent emergency 
funds to prevent the overthrow of friendly regimes.  Second, those most in need may be the most 
likely to be appreciative, presenting a better investment opportunity for donors.   
The most direct means by which aid could benefit targeted leaders is by providing 
additional resources for application to their usual tenure-seeking activities.  These resources 
allow some leaders to satisfy key constituencies, cementing their place in power.  Raw funds, 
however, are not equally fungible for all types of leaders at all points in their careers.  A static 
view of institutions suggests autocratic leaders will benefit more from aid.  Because they are less 
constrained by institutional checks, and responsible to a narrow swathe of the population, 
external resources fit directly into the tenure-extension activities of small winning coalitions.  
Democratic leaders, on the other hand, institutionally constrained and obligated to at least a 
plurality of the voting population, have little to gain and much to lose from expropriating 
development assistance for personal aggrandizement.
2
 
Politics, however, is not static.  Dynamic political processes within regime types 
condition the effect of aid on leader survival.  For nondemocratic leaders whose replacement is 
less institutionalized, aid inflows initially produce a destabilization of political competition.  The 
“lootable” aspect of external resource flows encourages competition at a time when their 
winning coalitions remain poorly institutionalized.  With the cementing of loyalties, this 
destabilizing impact reverses, allowing the utilization of aid in the manner described above.  
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Democratic leaders, on the other hand, are likely to benefit from aid during their “honeymoon”.  
Over time, the political opposition gains leverage over democratic leaders who have not 
managed to convert aid inflows into public goods increases, turning development assistance into 
a political liability.                
I test these hypotheses on a dataset of 4,954 leader years covering 820 separate leaders 
from 1960-2001 using a censored probit which accounts for strategic aid allocation in the 
selection stage and models duration dependence in the outcome stage.  In nondemocratic systems 
aid can insulate long-lived leaders over time, but is dangerous for the inexperienced.  The impact 
on aid-receiving democratic leaders is reversed.  While aid is of substantial help during the first 
years, it becomes a liability over time. These findings support the expectation that development 
assistance‟s effectiveness as a tool of tenure-extension will differ across institutions.  The 
analysis also suggests that processes of institutionalization play a formative role in the impact of 
aid on recipients.  Further, tests uncover evidence suggesting donor states consider the need and 
likely pliancy of their targets when allocating aid.  Leaders at a higher risk of losing office are 
significantly more likely to receive aid than those more secure in their positions.    
From 1960-2000, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
reports the donation of more than 786 billion dollars in development assistance to countries 
around the world.
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  Based on my results, we may conclude that much of allocated aid has fallen 
in the hands of leaders who stood to gain (or lose) personally from the windfall.  The cooperative 
moves of powerful countries relate to the domestic politics of targeted states in real, though 
complicated, ways.  An understanding of the friendly foreign policy toolkit holds academic and 
pragmatic value.  It will help international relations scholars better explain and predict the 
reactions of domestic elites, and assist policy-makers in the efficient allocation of resources        
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A brief review of literature connecting leader tenure and foreign policy decisions follows.  
I then elaborate the theoretical argument and hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional 
arrangements and dynamic processes.  In the third section I present the data and research design.  
The fourth section includes discussion of the statistical results.  Finally, I conclude by 
considering the import of these findings for the literature and the decisions of policymakers.    
Foreign Policy Targeting and Leader Survival 
 Most empirical investigations of leader tenure focus on domestic variables and personal 
characteristics, such as:  institutions, country wealth and size, economic stability and personal 
time in office (Bienen and van de Walle 1992; Londregan and Poole 1990; Chiozza and Choi 
2003).   Despite the clear effects of internal forces, room remains for external intervention to 
affect leaders‟ tenure.  Whether they are designed to do so or not, many foreign policy decisions 
hold the potential to help or hinder targeted elites.  Studies of foreign policy and leader tenure 
fixate on hostile foreign policy acts‟ potential to affect leaders by tapping into domestic 
dynamics.  The literature on diversionary theory, rally effects and war casualties posit that 
decisions to engage in conflict affect leader duration through domestic approval (Mitchell and 
Prins 2004; Lai and Reiter 2005; Mueller 1971).   Rather than the success or failure of domestic 
decisions, the current project investigates the impact of external decisions on leaders‟ ability to 
stay in office.  Research in this vein demonstrates the conditioning of the negative effect of 
military and economic conflict on leader tenure by target regime type (Chiozza and Goemans 
2003, 2004; McGillivray and Smith 2006; Marinov 2005).    
International relations scholars often interpret the business of international politics as 
essentially conflictual.  Most interstate interactions, however, feature cooperation.  Great powers 
wield a full range of strategies for rewarding their allies and enticing future cooperation, but 
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traditional studies have focused in on the macro-results or on the targeting process of these 
policies, rather than the link to leaders.  Studies of official development assistance, for example, 
tend to focus in on the fulfillment of donors‟ humanitarian goals.  Donor nations profess a desire 
to improve human rights, further democratization and encourage economic stability through their 
aid allocations, but success in achieving such goals remains mixed.  Regarding economic growth 
and stability, economists find that aid‟s impact is highly conditional on domestic socio-economic 
and climatic circumstances (Chenery and Strout 1966; Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004; 
Daalgard, Hansen and Tarp 2004; Kosack and Tobin 2005).  Research on the ability of aid to 
promote human rights and democratization varyingly finds that assistance produces no 
statistically significant improvements (Regan 1995; Knack 2004), or theorizes that inflows of 
foreign money will damage democratic accountability and government capacity (Geddes 1994; 
Svennson 2000; Brautigam and Knack 2004).  Researchers often blame the division between 
sincere humanitarian goals and strategic instrumental goals for the “failure” of donors to send aid 
where it is most likely to “work” (c.f. Collier and Dollar 2002; Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 
2001; McKinley and Little 1977).    
 A new strand of the literature, highly reliant upon Bueno de Mesquita and colleague‟s 
“selectorate theory” (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2005), directly 
entertains the link between aid and leader survival.  Lai and Morey (2006) and Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) apply similar lines of reasoning to conclude that leaders who 
are responsible only to a small portion of the population and thus accustomed to working for 
extended tenure through private pay-offs and stockpiling, will find these activities to be directly 
expanded by external resource flows.  They argue also that democratic leaders, tied to the 
interests of a far larger population, will find the process of parlaying aid into public goods less 
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efficient.  Kono and Montinola (2009) produce an extension of the selectorate model which leads 
them to emphasize cumulative aid distributions over contemporary flows.  In the only statistical 
evaluation of this question of which the author is aware, Kono and Montinola (2009) find that 
autocratic leaders are assisted by aid only in the “long term” (measured by the sum of aid 
allocated to them over their tenure) while democratic leaders derive a very small benefit from aid 
received more recently. 
This provocative, new branch of the literature promises to generate more interest in the 
future.  These studies, however, fall short of an accurate representation of leaders‟ incentives 
within the game of foreign aid.  Though selectorate theory has redirected our attention in 
profitable ways, it also tends to produce a static picture of the elites in question. Certainly, 
intuition and evidence suggest that politics rarely stands still.  Leaders‟ risk of losing power 
changes over time (Wright 2008a; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 
1995; Bienen and Van de Walle 1991), and leaders face different types of pressure at different 
points in their careers.  Even Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005, 100) acknowledge it should take 
some time for winning coalitions to solidify and thus for the “logic of political survival” to 
manifest.  Recent scholarship has incorporated leaders‟ experience in office as a theoretical 
explanation for conflict behavior (c.f. Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Wolford 
2007).   Most pertinent to the project at hand Wright (2008) considers the impact of survival 
probability on the likelihood of autocratic leaders expropriating aid monies to private purposes 
vs. funneling them into growth-producing endeavors.  
Furthermore, analyses of aid‟s impact on leader tenure must also consider the strategic 
incentives of donor states.  Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) demonstrated that 
allocation patterns appear to be driven by calculation of the leverage likely to result.  If donors 
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send aid in the hopes of achieving something, then two types of endogeneity will surface in the 
analysis of aid and leader survival.  Most obviously, the “treatment” of development assistance 
has not been randomly assigned.  Leaders who get aid are different from leaders who do not.  
Their countries are likely more poor, possibly less free, and probably closer to conflict.  This 
pattern of strategic allocation creates a non-random sample of aid-receiving elites and may 
interfere with estimation strategies which do not correct for the selection.  The possibility of 
donors considering the level of risk faced by prospective targets introduces a second possible 
source of endogeneity.  Donors who intend to shore up friendly administrations abroad would be 
foolish to spend their money on the well-entrenched.  Further, those looking for the type of aid-
for-policy deals discussed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) should look to leaders 
with elevated risk at home.  The over-comfortable leader has little need of aid‟s tenure-extending 
promises and is, thus, generally unlikely to find aid worth the domestic trouble of changing 
policies.  The group of aid-receiving leaders, then, may face higher levels of risk ex ante.           
In the argument developed below, I tackle these theoretical and statistical challenges, 
incorporating the expectations of selectorate theory with the recognition of over-time dynamics 
and strategic allocation.  Donors send aid where they believe it to be of most strategic use, while 
both institutions and temporal political processes condition the role aid plays in reducing 
recipients‟ risks.  Testing this argument requires explicit modeling of both possible endogenous 
processes and of temporal dynamics.  Following the theory section, I introduce an appropriate 
statistical model.             
Coming Into Money 
This theory shares two foundational assumptions with the selectorate theory (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2005).  First, leaders are rational and survival-driven, acting so as to stay in 
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power as long as possible.  As no secondary political goals can be obtained without this prior 
condition, leaders always have the incentive to decrease their risk of losing office.  Second, all 
leaders owe their place in power to a portion of the population (the winning coalition) whose 
support is critical to the defeat of political challenges.  The size of this core constituency is 
determined by institutions.  The survival problem, for all leaders, involves the setting of a budget 
which maximizes the utility of the winning coalition through a mix of private and public goods. 
One of the most frequently cited conclusions of the selectorate model is the tendency for 
those leaders with small winning coalitions to allocate more private goods; those with big 
winning coalitions, more public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 79-93).  Intuitively, raw 
resources spread amongst a group provide less utility as the size of the group increases.  
Provision of private goods becomes prohibitively expensive for democratic leaders, whose 
winning coalition consists of a plurality of the adult population.  Autocratic leaders, in contrast, 
are rarely responsible to more than a handful of powerful military, economic or party elites.  This 
variation in relative size defines leaders‟ tenure-extending activities.  For democratic leaders, the 
survival-motive requires maximization of public goods; for autocratic leaders, private pay-offs to 
the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005).  Consequently, each individual member 
of a small winning coalition receives a higher payoff, and the gap between members and non-
members increases.   
Coupled with a higher likelihood of being excluded from future winning coalitions 
should their leader be defeated, this discrepancy engenders a high level of loyalty (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2005, 92-93).  Public goods produce nonexcludable benefits, meaning the perks 
of winning coalition membership decrease with the size of the group.  The strength of the loyalty 
norm decreases in turn, producing a much higher baseline risk of losing office for democratic 
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leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 93).  By affecting the loyalty norm, relative winning 
coalition size also determines the amount of overall spending required.  When loyalty is high 
(winning coalition small), leaders may safely reserve more of the state budget for personal use 
“…if they find themselves at risk of being deposed” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 93).  Thus, 
autocratic leaders‟ tenure-extending activities also involve the stockpiling of resources, while 
democratic leaders must commit to spend nearly all of their resources to fending off challengers 
in a low-loyalty system (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2007, 259).      
Departing from Bueno de Mesquita et al., however, I also assume that dynamic processes 
of learning and institutionalization intervene, changing the optimal strategies and the competency 
of their pursuit over time.  Working from these basic precepts, I explore the likely role of aid in 
the survival problem of targeted elites.  I begin with a discussion of strategic actions in the 
allocation process.  The theory proceeds to the target‟s incentives, considering the basic reason 
why aid should matter.  Then, I outline the expectations of aid‟s impact on survival based on a 
static formulation of selectorate theory.  Finally, I present an argument for the mediating effect 
of dynamic processes on leaders‟ ability to benefit from external assistance.   
Aid Allocation 
 Donor states do not send their money overseas without expectations attached.  Dudley 
and Montmarquette (1976) profess the conventional wisdom on foreign aid most succinctly:  
“…people usually give because they expect to get something in return.  … in practice very few 
transfers are unilateral” (133). While the types of “return” may vary along the spectrum of 
humanitarian vs. strategic, donor states should be expected to allocate aid somewhat rationally. 
 Consider two principle motivations for the allocation of official development assistance:  
(1) propping up friendly administrations abroad, and (2) “purchasing” policy concessions.  
Strategic donors will not pursue the first goal without considering whether the target requires the 
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proffered assistance.  Leaders enjoying rock-solid domestic situations have less need for external 
help than do those facing rocky times.  If foreign aid operates to decrease targets‟ risks, then it 
will be best allocated to those leaders who have some domestic risks.   
 In the second case, an aid-for-policy deal such as those discussed by Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith (2007, 2009), donors allocate aid as a salve to offset the costs of providing a sub-
optimal change in policy.  This change may be purely strategic, but it need not be.  Much 
development assistance, for example, arrives with stipulations for economic reform aimed at 
alleviating poverty and stimulating growth.  To the extent that such concessions alter the status 
quo, they are politically costly for targets, at least in the short run.  Leaders whose domestic 
prospects are good have little motivation to commit to these potential costs.  Likelihood of losing 
office cannot decrease indefinitely; it is bounded.  Leaders who are already secure, then, will 
reap little additional benefit from aid monies.  Without elevated fear of losing office, the value-
added from receipt of aid will likely fail to off-set the costs of concessions.    
 Given the dynamics of survival-motivated leaders, therefore, we should expect donors to 
look for opportunities where targets perceive a need for external assistance.  Receiving elites are 
likely to be most receptive to the requests of donor nations when domestic mechanisms of 
support falter.  Moreover, donors sometimes specifically intend their aid-monies to substitute for 
domestic support.  Strategic donors, then, may choose to send aid more frequently to high risk 
cases.   
H1:  Aid allocation is more likely for leaders facing higher risks of losing office. 
Foreign Aid and Leader Survival 
Beginning with a survival-driven leader turns our interest to the means by which aid 
could contribute to a reduction in the risk of losing office.  As a positive sanction, foreign aid 
may communicate the good will of the international community (Baldwin 1985).  It may come 
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with many strings attached; donor nations expect to see infrastructure development, improved 
human rights reports or lower malnutrition levels.  But its concrete ramifications for survival 
stem from its ability to augment existing tenure-extension activities, a capacity referred to here 
as fungibility.  The principle of fungibility can be understood quite literally.  Reporting 
requirements may not be strict enough to prevent some of the money from disappearing; 
institutions in the developing world are infamously opaque, making its path very hard to trace.   
But the conversion of aid to personal benefit need not be dollar for dollar.  Donors may 
restrict the direct diversion of foreign money to other purposes – whether by delivering actual 
goods or funneling provisions through nongovernmental organizations – without negating the 
instrumental benefit of aid.  Describing fungibility, Kosack and Tobin (2005, 210) note “… [aid] 
ends up largely substituting for government spending that would have occurred anyway, thereby 
freeing up government monies to be spent as the government wants.”  An influx of extra money 
for infrastructure development or welfare programs liberates domestic funds which might 
previously have been allocated to these sectors.  If an outside power is feeding the people, the 
government need not.  Empirical research supports the suspicion that aid operates to the benefit 
of local elites rather than to that of their populations or donors (Pack and Pack 1993; Boone 
1995; Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu 1998; Kosack and Tobin 2005).   
Whether through direct diversion or budgetary substitution, survival-driven elites aim to 
convert some portion of aid into reduced risk through reinforcement of their supporters‟ loyalty.  
No matter how restricted the system, political competition exists.  For example, within one-party 
systems such as Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party rival factions develop and compete for 
top positions.  The solidity of one‟s political support base, therefore, is the first line of defense 
for survival-minded leaders.  In the language of selectorate theory, loss of even a small portion of 
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the winning coalition may result in the victory of a challenger.  When loyalty in the winning 
coalition drops, legislative coalitions deteriorate, coup-makers recruit successfully, 
demonstrators gather in the street, and parties lose elections.  Pleasing the winning coalition is 
not necessarily a ticket to overall domestic stability.  In small winning coalition systems, the gap 
between the ruling elite and the people widens as loyalty-generating private transfers enrich the 
ruler‟s supporters.  This may make for an inherently unstable situation as grievances develop and 
proliferate.  But, for individual leaders, a happy, loyal winning coalition is a necessary – though 
not sufficient – condition for staying in office. 
It follows that aid-receiving leaders will attempt to exploit fungibility to bolster their 
supporters‟ loyalty.  Selectorate theory‟s view of leader strategy suggests their success in this 
endeavor will vary by regime type.  Institutions of leader selection determine the effectiveness of 
raw funds for purchasing continued tenure.  Autocratic leaders responsible to the military and 
business elite could expect a much bigger bang for their buck than democratic leaders 
responsible to a plurality of their electorate (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).   
Institutions and the Fungibility of Aid   
Given these dynamics, foreign aid will factor differently into leaders‟ attempts to extend 
tenure.  Under conditions of small winning coalition and high loyalty, aid presents a potentially 
valuable tool.   An increase in available raw funds translates directly into higher pay-offs for 
winning coalition members, without necessitating a cut in stockpiles.   Aid, then, can assist 
nondemocratic leaders directly in both the cultivation of winning coalition satisfaction and in the 
accumulation of resources to counteract exogenous shocks (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 
Lai and Morey 2006).     
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For democratic leaders, however, the ability of aid monies to contribute to winning 
coalition satisfaction may be stunted.  The obligation to a large proportion of the population 
makes allocation of private goods inefficient.  They must commit to spend nearly all government 
resources, yet the public goods provided disperse equally amongst the entire population, 
diminishing private perks for supporters and deadening loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 
92-98).  Any newly arriving resources must be turned towards the overarching goal of shoring up 
support in the interest of tenure, and this means providing further public benefits.   But 
development assistance may prove an unreliable tool of democratic tenure extension. 
Foreign aid boasts only a patchy record of public goods provision.  Economic growth, for 
example, tends to follow aid allocation only in already thriving economies with good macro-
economic policy (Burnside and Dollar 2004; Kosack and Tobin 2005).  Democratic leaders who 
are providing high levels of public goods, and thus already enjoy a relatively low risk of losing 
office, may manage to coax some additional public benefit out of aid flows.  Leaders presiding 
over weak economies, and thus facing higher risks, cannot make external funds work to their 
advantage.  Given that a weak economy is consistently a key predictor of aid allocation (c.f. Lai 
2003), aid will often have little or no discernable impact on existing levels of public goods. 
Since funneling aid into further public goods provision may prove ineffective for 
extending tenure, democratic leaders could sometimes prefer to funnel it into private benefits for 
key political players.  Consider, for example, the behavior of President Chiluba (1991-2001) in 
Zambia.  Ex-post investigations by Transparency International have revealed that the President 
maintained a “… slush fund … to appropriate public funds and „dole‟ them out to favored or 
politically useful persons or groups without accounting for them,” and that “Parliament allowed 
criminal funds to be operated throughout President Chiluba‟s tenure of office” (Yambayamba 
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2007, 5).  The temptation and the actuality of such corruption exist in democracies.  At the 
beginning of Chiluba‟s tenure, Zambia fell within the realm of democracy by the most 
commonly utilized measure in international relations scholarship, scoring a 6 on the Polity2 
composite scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2003).  Over the course of his term, however, the 
President‟s corruption assisted in the deterioration of governance in Zambia to a mixed score.  
Democratic leaders operating in better institutionalized systems, however, face significant 
institutional barriers which make corruption an inefficient strategy. 
In consolidated democracies the oversight rights of other branches, freedom of the press 
and the rule of law constrain the executive (c.f. Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-14).  When functioning 
properly and in conjunction, these characteristics should make it very difficult for leaders to 
divert aid monies and very politically costly to be caught in the attempt.  In short, savvy 
democratic elites know that their institutional environment encourages continued democratic 
behavior (Gates, Hegre, Jones and Strand 2006); diverting foreign aid directly to personal 
aggrandizement is simply not the most efficient way for them to utilize their resources.   
For autocratic leaders, on the other hand, the line between state funds and private funds is 
blurry at best.  Little domestic cost exists to prevent the efficient conversion of aid to private 
goods and benefits.  A leader like the Congo‟s Mobutu Sese Seku simply delivers envelopes full 
of money to key elites in order to purchase their loyalty (Wrong 2007, 22).  Regime type 
conditions incentives by determining both the ease of diverting aid money to private use and the 
effectiveness of such a strategy.  For autocratic leaders, the conversion of aid to increased tenure 
is straightforward and should be relatively effective.  Democratic leaders attempting to channel 
aid to personal benefit face dimmer prospects.  The institutional argument produces the 
following hypotheses:     
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H2:  The receipt of foreign aid will decrease the risks of autocratic leaders. 
 
H3:  The receipt of foreign aid will decrease the risks of democratic leaders less 
than it does nondemocratic leaders.   
 
Dynamic Political Processes and Aid 
Dynamic political processes further condition the ability of recipient elites to benefit from 
aid allocations.  Leaders‟ risks do not remain fixed at the same level on their first and last days of 
office.  Through general processes such as learning and institutionalization, politics moves.  
Underlying the particular circumstances and exogenous shocks of any given career, these general 
social processes contribute to the empirically noted declining baseline risk of losing office over 
time (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bienen and Van de 
Walle 1991).  These processes also alter the impact of aid on recipients.   Over time leaders‟ base 
of support follows a social process of institutionalization and decline.  This process, shaped by 
the institutional pattern of competition, determines individuals‟ willingness to develop loyalty. 
Institutionalization can be thought of as producing changes in the “need to please” one‟s 
winning coalition over time.  For autocratic leaders, it takes time for confidence and loyalty to 
build due to the high risks of exclusion in the future.  Newly instated nondemocratic leaders are 
the challenger described by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005,) as unable to firmly demonstrate 
sufficient “affinity” for initial winning coalition members.  Because some members of the new 
coalition remain uncertain as to their future membership, they will be more easily poached by 
early challengers.  “Lootable”, externally-derived aid resources may exacerbate the number and 
intensity of these initial challenges.  Challengers can credibly promise uncertain members of the 
incumbent coalition a greater portion of aid resources.   If able to hang on to power, however, 
nondemocratic leaders will dole out aid resources in the manner described in the previous 
section, creating a stronger and stronger bond between themselves and their coalition over time.   
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Democratic leaders‟ winning coalitions, in contrast, are likely to be most supportive and 
generous in their interpretation of performance immediately following the winning of office.  
The process of political campaign and election is essentially an exercise in the mobilization and 
cementing of political coalitions.  Victory provides an intense burst of energy and cohesion.  The 
popularity of elected officials is at its highest while the public remains under the influence of this 
feeling.  During this “honeymoon” the competition finds it socially distasteful to comment 
negatively and mainstream media, consequently, present almost entirely positive evaluations of 
the new leader/government (Brody 1992, 27-44; Lockerbie, Borreli and Hedger 1998).  This 
favorable climate does not last.  As time progresses, public approval lags, opening the door for 
legal political competition to further wear away at that support; political actors, finding their 
share of policy goods or power unsatisfying, criticize incumbent policy choices and performance 
(Altman 2000; Bearce and Hinckley 1992, 21-44 and 60-74; Light 1999, 36).  In both 
presidential and coalition systems, these dynamics contribute to an increasing hazard of failure 
for democratically elected leaders (Warwick 1992; Altman 2000).   
Because the public and the competition are inclined to feel favorably about democratic 
leaders earlier in their tenure than later, foreign aid may be of most assistance during the 
democratic honeymoon.  Even if aid does not produce substantial results during this time, 
observers may be willing to credit the leader with having obtained the funds or with maintaining 
friendly international relations.  Over time, the natural process of political competition may 
combine negatively with the limited public returns of the received aid.  Apparent inability to 
make aid “work” for the people over time provides the competition with a ready-made critique, 
especially if conditionality agreements have not been met.  Even if aid has produced some public 
goods improvement, democratic leaders may find it difficult to claim credit.  Many public 
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benefits attributable to aid monies, such as infrastructure or education improvements, trickle 
down through government agencies or are provided directly by foreign nongovernmental 
organizations.  The line of attribution in these cases does not point unambiguously back to the 
head of government, but branches out to external powers, bureaucrats and other government 
figures.  Further, development assistance as a resource is not unique to the leader in power at the 
time of receipt.  The extreme rarity of donor nations reducing aid amounts following democratic 
turnover bolsters domestic competition‟s ability to credibly promise to perform at least as well as 
the incumbent.
4
  The effect of foreign aid on democratic leaders, then, may be expected to 
change over time:  initially it will be beneficial, but in the long run aid allocations may hurt.  
Over-time dynamics in loyalty produce the following hypotheses:  
H4:  The ability of aid to insulate democratic leaders will decrease over time. 
H5:  The ability of aid to insulate autocratic leaders will increase over time.    
Modeling Leader Survival 
The data upon which this argument is tested consist of 4,692 leader years covering 791 
separate leaders from 1960-2001.  Data on these leaders come from Goemans, Gleditsch and 
Chiozza‟s (2006) dataset on the survival of leaders, Archigos version 2.5.  Leaders of countries 
which donated aid in the current year have been excluded from the analysis in order to preserve a 
reasonable comparison category.  Discrete event history data such as these require modeling of 
duration dependence (c.f. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 69-84; Beck, Katz and Tucker 
1998).  Given the strategic allocation of aid monies, the data also require a selection stage (c.f. 
Heckman 1979).  Aid fails to be allocated in 543 of the leader years in question.      
The censored probit model provides a straightforward means of addressing both problems 
simultaneously (c.f. Dubin and Rivers 1989).
5
  This model simultaneously estimates two 
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equations, one for selection the other for an outcome of interest.  The selection stage will be 
allocation of aid; outcome, failure by collapse of winning coalition.  To control for the 
expectation that donors allocate aid to leaders with higher likelihood of failure, an endogenous 
instrument technique will be applied in the selection stage (c.f. Maddala 1986).  This involves 
obtaining probabilities of failure for each observation from the outcome stage and adjusting by 
the error of prediction.   
The outcome stage of the censored probit will model leader failure as a function of aid‟s 
changing impact over time and across regime type.  Institutional and temporal conditioning will 
be modeled through interaction effects.  First, aid will be interacted with an indicator of regime 
type, then with the natural log of the targeted leader‟s experience in office.  Conveniently, 
controlling for duration dependence can be accomplished simply by including the constitutive 
term for the time-aid interaction.  Though studies often employ a more complex function of time 
– using cubic splines, cubic polynomials or estimating a separate slope coefficient for every year 
in analysis – the duration dependence in this data appears to be well captured by the logarithmic 
function.
6
  Below, I discuss specific measurement choices.        
1
st
 Stage Measurement: 
 The selection stage dependent variable is an indicator tagging whether the leader received 
a non-zero value of net official development assistance in the given year, based on the OECD‟s 
reporting.  Given the high level of bureaucratic inertia in aid allocation processes, another 
indicator variable tags observations which received aid in the previous year.   
 The key theoretical variable for the selection equation is an estimate of leaders‟ baseline 
probability of losing office.  Within the latent variable framework used by Maddala (1986, 242-
247), the outcome stage of our censored probit model estimates a continuous, latent variable of 
the probability of losing office.  Recognizing this indicates the need to correct for this recursive 
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relationship between the two stages using an instrument.  Maddala (1986, 246) recommends 
estimating the outcome stage, calculating a predicted value, and adjusting by the standard error 
of the prediction.  Table 1 reports the probit coefficients utilized in this process.  In order to 
calculate values of the instrument for observations which do not receive aid, this regression 
utilizes an adjusted measure of aid.  The final outcome equation uses the natural log of aid 
divided by gross domestic product.  The measure in Table 1 adds one to the aid measure before 
taking the log, which prevents zeros from dropping out of analysis.  The instrument, Z, ranges 
from -31 to just over 2.  These values correspond to a range of predicted probabilities of failure 
from nearly zero to 0.66.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the instrument and the 
more intuitive concept of the predicted probability of failure.   
 To account for more traditional explanations of aid allocation, I include a number of 
control variables.  As an indicator of humanitarian need, I include lagged population growth 
taken from the World Development Indicators.  This variable is highly correlated with other 
measures of need, notably birthrate and infant mortality, but has substantially better coverage.  
Donors‟ commercial interests are captured by a logged measure of the value of imports from 
OECD donors received by the target in the prior year (Gleditsch 2002).  Prior work on aid 
allocation in the selectorate theory school has found that donors tend to send aid to smaller 
coalition systems (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).  I control for this using the ordinal 
measure of Bueno de Mesquita et al‟s (2005) winning coalition concept, W.  Other indicators of 
strategic interest include:  an indicator of internationalized civil war from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Project (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002), an indicator of 
former colonial status, an indicator for oil production capacity (Energy Information 
Administration 2009), and one for a defensive or offensive alliance tie to one of the OECD 
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donors (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002).  Finally, I also incorporate a measure of logged 




 Stage Measurement: 
Most studies of leader survival utilize Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza‟s (2006) 
indicator of leader failure as a dependent variable, excluding deaths from natural causes.  For the 
theory at hand, this variable contains noise.
1
  We are concerned here with the process of 
maintaining one‟s winning coalition.  Thus the exits of leaders leaving of their own volition or as 
proscribed by constitutional term limits do not indicate “failure”.  Accounting for this problem 
required investigation of the circumstances of exit for the leaders within my dataset which 
Archigos coded as “regular”.  These regular exits include term limits, impeachments, coalition 
dissolutions, elections and resignations.  I code both the situation of exit and the relationship 
between the entering and the exiting leader.  Using this additional information I code an indicator 
for winning coalition failure.  It obtains under two conditions:  irregular replacement, or 
replacement by an actor who is not an heir/successor.
2
  The natural log of the Archigos variable 
sumten, which tracks the cumulative days of a leader‟s stay in office, is used both to deal with 
duration dependence and to explicitly allow the effect of aid to vary over time.  The logarithmic 
functional form fits the expectations of institutionalization, as it will allow for diminishing 
effects over time as the changes slow.   
The basic data on aid, available from 1960, come from the OECD‟s online database.  The 
operationalization of aid begins with OECD‟s total net official development assistance variable, 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful to an astute reviewer for bringing this problem to my attention. 
2
 Entering leaders can relate to the exiting leader in three ways.  “Heir/Successors” come from the same party, 
administration or the family of the exiting leader.  “Challengers” come from opposing parties, rival factions within 
the dominant party, or the military.  The “Neutral parties” coding is used when party affiliation cannot be 
determined or when an interim ruling coalition is put in place.  Unless an heir/successor takes over following term-
limits or resignation I code winning coalition failure as 1.  
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which includes bilateral aid disbursements from all OECD donor countries.   Following several 
empirical analyses (Knack 2004; Daalgard et al. 2004; Lai 2003; Boone 1995), I adjust my aid 
measure in two ways.  First, size of economy is accounted for by dividing aid per capita by gross 
domestic product per capita in millions of constant US dollars.  Second, a logarithmic a 
transformation corrects for heavy skew and diminishing returns.  To capture any changing 
influence of aid over time, this variable is interacted with the log of time.   
An indicator for big winning coalition/democratic institutions comes from the Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2005) W measure.  When W exceeds .75, Wbig equals one.  I utilize a 
dichotomous measure here rather than the ordinal scale, because my theoretical expectations 
describe discrete forms of behavior rather than a range of behaviors.  I posit that the institutions 
of democracy, associated with the biggest W values, create a qualitatively different process.  
Control variables include economic variables from Gleditsch‟s (2002) expanded trade 
and economic data:  lagged GDP growth, and lagged total trade in current year US dollars.  The 
natural log of population also comes from the Gleditsch data.  Domestic challenges are captured 
by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program‟s measure of level of civil conflict, including the values:  
0, no conflict; 1, minor conflict producing at least 25 deaths; 2, civil war producing at least 1,000 
deaths.  Regional dummy variables based on Hensel‟s (1994) coding have also been included. 
Findings 
 Analysis of the statistical results will begin by assessing the appropriateness of the 
endogenous modeling techniques.  Table 2 contains the coefficients and fit information from the 
censored probit of aid allocation and winning coalition failure with an endogenous instrument in 
the selection stage.  The Wald statistic reported at the bottom of this table is highly significant, 
indicating a correlation between the processes.  This indicates the appropriateness of the 
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censored model.  Secondly, the instrumented probability of failure used in the allocation model is 
highly significant, indicating the presence of a second endogenous process.   
 Aid allocation stage results lie in the second column of Table 2.
3
  The analysis suggests 
that strategic concerns weigh heavily on the decision to allocate aid.  A state which did not 
receive aid in the previous period is significantly more likely to do so if their leader faces 
elevated risks of losing office.  Increasing risks of winning coalition failure steeply increases the 
probability of receiving aid, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1.  This figure charts the 
probability of allocation from the minimum value of the instrument for probability failure to the 
minimum value within its 90
th
 percentile.   For ease of interpretation, I have transformed the 
instrument values to corresponding probabilities of failure by taking the normal probability of 
the product of the instrument and the standard error of prediction.  Leaders facing a 40% risk of 
coalition failure will receive aid with a probability of 76%.  Corresponding to the postulated 
logic, leaders with risks near zero have almost zero likelihood of receiving aid.  Hypothesis 1 
receives considerable support from these results; donors appear to favor leaders experiencing 
personal need of aid‟s potentially insulating effects.  Of course, at this stage we can conclude 
neither that aid actually reduces recipients‟ risks of losing power, nor that those leaders who are 
facing higher risks exhibit higher levels of compliance with donor requests.   From the selection 
stage, we can merely observe findings consistent with a strategic allocation process.   
 Donors do appear more likely to send aid to needy countries, based on the positive 
coefficient for population growth.  The magnitude of this effect, however, is smaller than that of 
the leader-level strategic variable.  The predicted probabilities given values of need from the 
minimum to 90
th
 percentile are displayed in the right panel of Figure 2.   Across this range, 
variable‟s impact changes by only 39 points.  At the high value of population growth, probability 
                                                 
3
 See supplementary materials for independent probit regression and fit statistics at the allocation stage. 
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of allocation is little better than a coin flip at 50.6%.  Most other variables within the selection 
equation achieve significance in the expected direction.  Former colonial ties and strong alliances 
with donor states both increase the likelihood of aid allocation.  Imports may be a better measure 
of development than of donors‟ commercial interests; importing more from OECD states leads to 
lower probabilities of receiving aid.  The model also confirms Bueno de Mesquita and Smith‟s 
(2007, 2009) contention that donors send aid more frequently to small winning coalition states.   
 Having evaluated H1 and found significant support, we may move on to consider the 
remaining four hypotheses regarding the role of institutions and temporal dynamics.  The 
winning coalition failure model in the first column of Table 2 contains the coefficients of interest 
for these hypothesis tests.  As discussed above, the log of time models baseline duration 
dependence.  Similar to many previous studies (c.f. Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bienen and Van de Walle 1991), this coefficient indicates that the 
risks of losing office decrease over time as leaders become more cemented in power.   
 The aid terms feature two layers of multiplicative effect.  First, the continuous aid 
variable has been interacted with a dummy for regime type.  Then these two terms are further 
interacted with the natural log of time.  Thus, aid interacted with Wbig describes the effect of aid 
when winning coalitions are big and the log of time equals zero; this will generally refer to 
democratic aid-recipients on their first day in office.  The aid constituent term references aid‟s 
effect on leaders with small winning coalition systems on their first day in office.  To make this 
more obvious I have labeled the rows as to what type of leader each term references.  With each 
unit increase in time, the slopes indicated by the aid and aid*Wbig terms shift by the magnitude 
of the coefficients of the interaction with time.   
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 While these coefficients themselves do not provide much intuitive information they can 
be of assistance in preliminary evaluation of hypotheses four and five.  We may note first of all, 
that all four coefficients achieve high levels of statistical significance.  Aid exerts an observable 
impact on leaders on its first day of receipt, but the change in this impact over time is also 
distinguishable from zero.  Consistent with expectations, aid decreases the risks of democratic 
leaders initially – indicated by the negative coefficient for aid to big winning coalition systems.  
The immediate impact for small winning coalition leaders is a significant increase in risk of 
coalition failure, marked by the positive sign of aid to small winning coalition systems.
7
  And, 
over time, the positive coefficient on the log of time interaction marks a diminishing of aid‟s 
benefits for the big winning coalition systems.  Meanwhile the negative sign of aid to small 
coalition systems times the log of experience shows developing benefits for the small coalition 
systems 
 From this initial evaluation of the coefficients, we glean information supportive of H4 
and H5.  It appears that autocratic leaders do experience an initial destabilization with benefits 
developing over time.  Following the opposite pattern, democratic leaders benefit up front but 
experience a diminishing effect.  Evaluating the significance of these trends at specific points in 
time as well as the general impact of aid postulated by the static winning coalition argument (H2 
and H3) requires more work.  Given the complicated interaction effects, further investigation 
using measures of substantive significance is well-advised (c.f. Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006; 
Kam and Franzese 2007).  To provide an intuitive representation of aid‟s dynamic effects, I 
calculated the change in probability of failure over time for ideal types of big winning coalition 
and small winning coalition leaders.  The probability of failure was calculated first with aid at 
one standard deviation above the mean and then at the mean level.
8
  The difference of these two 
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quantities provides an interesting indication of aid‟s substantive impact.  Confidence in the 
accuracy of the calculation was increased using Monte Carlo techniques to draw a large sample 
of beta coefficients from the variance-covariance matrix of the censored probit model.  The 
calculation, repeated 100 times, was made on a sample of 100 observations, identical except for 
the estimated coefficients.  This procedure provides 10,000 observations of the percent change in 
probability of failure for each type of leader.  The reported statistic is the mean prediction from 
the sample, with 95% confidence intervals.  A negative difference indicates that the probability 
of failure was lower at high levels of aid; a positive difference, that risks were lower at the mean 
level of aid. 
 Figure 3 charts these first differences across temporal ranges appropriate to the regime 
type.   For democratic leaders, 99% of cases fail prior to the 18
th
 year in power, so the x-axis 
ends at that point.  This visual representation provides considerable additional evidence in favor 
of H4.  For democratic leaders, whose winning coalition is most charitable early in the term, 
higher levels of foreign aid produce lower risks of losing office only in the early years.  The 
insulation effect is substantial, with risks in the first days of office reduced by 60%.  The decay 
in benefits proceeds steeply, however.  Within two years and nine months, the confidence 
intervals include zero.  Another six months brings a significant risk-increasing effect, which tops 
out at a 26% increase for the longest-enduring democratic leaders.  The dotted, gray, vertical line 
in the figure represents the 50
th
 percentile in big winning coalition leader tenure.  It matches 
almost perfectly to the point at which aid‟s effect becomes destabilizing.   
 Figure 3 also provides support for H5, demonstrating a significant destabilizing effect 
which diminishes over time.  Receiving aid during the first days of tenure increases a 
nondemocratic leader‟s likelihood of coalition failure by 27%.  This dangerous impact reverses, 
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but at a leisurely pace.  Leaders must cling to power for 17 ½ years before the destabilizing 
effect loses significance.  At this point 83% of autocratic leaders would already have lost office.  
The insulating effect reaches 11.7% at its highest point, corresponding to the very rare occasion 
of 46 years in office. 
 While this analysis provides significant support for the dynamic hypotheses four and five, 
it contradicts the basic winning coalition arguments voiced in H2 and H3.  Democratic leaders 
stand to benefit much more from aid than do their small winning coalition counterparts, at least 
for a couple of years.  The insulation effect in the first two years of a big winning coalition 
system outstrips that available to nondemocratic leaders both in magnitude – 60% compared to 
11.7% – and in the proportion of leaders likely to experience it – 50% versus 17%.    
Temporal Dynamics vs. The End of the Cold War 
 A growing number of theoretical and empirical works contend that patterns of aid 
allocation and aid effectiveness altered with the end of the Cold War and superpower politics 
(c.f. Bermeo 2008; Bearce and Tirone 2008; Berthelemy 2006; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004; 
Burnside and Dollar 2004).  Scholars in this emerging school of thought have found evidence 
that donors in the 1990s and onwards exhibit greater likelihood of:  allocating to more 
democratic countries with better macroeconomic and human rights policies, breaking off aid to 
states which do not meet agreements, and of behaving less “strategically” in the Cold War sense.  
If these arguments hold weight, then the pattern of endogenous processes could differ in the Cold 
War as opposed to the “New World Order” of the 1990s.  Table 3 contains models run on the 
sub-sample of Cold War and New World Order years.     
 The strategic behavior of donor states does appear to have changed after the fall of the 
Soviet Union.  In the 1990s model the correlation between allocation and outcome stage fails to 
achieve significance.  While higher risk leaders are still more likely to receive aid, the effect is 
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less significant than during the Cold War.  This difference in statistical significance suggests that 
donors‟ behavior has become less consistent regarding the desirability of distressed targets.  In 
future analyses it may be profitable to disaggregate OECD bilateral aid by donor and investigate 
differences in strategy.   
 The general pattern of aid‟s dynamic effect across institutions holds across the eras.  
Autocrats are initially destabilized, with the harmful effect diminishing over time; democrats‟ 
initial insulation decays over time.  After 1990, however, the initial insulating effect on 
democratic leaders is smaller in magnitude and much less significant (β= -.2820, p=.092 
compared to β= -.4658, p=.003).  The overtime drag on this effect fails to reach statistical 
significance (p=.115).  Some portion of the inefficiency in the post-Cold War model may come 
from the considerably reduced sample size, with less than half the number of observations in this 
time period as opposed to the nearly 30 years of Cold War politics.           
Conclusion 
Too, often in the field of international relations, we focus only on the conflictual 
behaviors of the great powers while ignoring their extensive repertoire of friendly foreign policy 
tools.  The research presented here demonstrates the need to expand the scope of our analysis:  
pacific foreign policy decisions exert real effects on the politics of weaker countries.  Institutions 
and political dynamics within targeted states, however, exert strong and interesting conditioning 
upon the outcomes of foreign policy strategies.  My analyses have demonstrated a political 
impact within states targeted by foreign policy, but this impact varies given the institutions of 
representation, and the experience of the receiving leader.  Aid can significantly shore up the 
career of new democratic leaders, insulating them from the threat of winning coalition failure by 
up to 60%.  But, if arriving late, aid can also cause problems for those responsible to a large 
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coalition of supporters.  Ironically, foreign assistance causes serious problems for the small 
winning coalition leaders who accept it.  A destabilization of 30% may follow from receipt of a 
generous amount of aid.   
The findings reported here contribute a new dimension to our understanding of foreign 
policy, and of foreign aid in particular.  Extant studies have considered a static picture of politics 
within target states.  But the abilities and resources of politicians change over time in systematic 
ways about which we can theorize.  More generally, the realm of friendly foreign policy effects 
deserves more scholarly attention, not least of all because it constitutes a significant public 
expenditure for many western nations.  Studies of alternative strategies, such as military 
assistance and diplomatic support, should be investigated to determine whether a similar pattern 
holds.   
More immediately, however, this analysis raises intriguing questions about the policy 
outcomes of aid allocation.  When leaders receive aid that helps them hold onto power, does this 
translate to higher compliance with donor requests?   When it hurts, do targets become more 
recalcitrant?  Why take money which spawns dangerous levels of instability and competition?  
And, while on the surface it seems positive that aid tends to make democratic leaders more 
secure, this need not be the case.  The insulation of status quo administrations may also explain 
findings that donor goals of democratization (Knack 2004) and human rights improvements fail 
to be achieved (Regan 1995).  Alternatively, the swift decay of the helpful effect into a political 
liability may be undergirded by increases in corruption and scandal as democrats utilize fungible 
aid monies to enrich themselves and their closest supporters.  A parallel argument may be made 
for the seeming positive of aid‟s destabilizing effect on more autocratic leaders.  The fall of such 
leaders does not necessarily imply the instatement of democracy.  If these leaders are replaced by 
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more of the same, aid may prove different than the traditional “resource curse” only in that it 
could have been prevented.    
While research on this topic continues, allocation of development assistance is not likely 
to pause and await our final conclusions.  In the meantime, policymakers motivated by 
humanitarian rather than strategic goals would be well-advised to reconsider the merit of 
political leaders who receive aid monies.  To make good foreign policy we must consider the 
institutional incentives of elites on the receiving end.  For donors interested in the 
democratization and political progress of democratizing or autocratic regimes, aid may be an 
inappropriate policy tool.  Rather, as indicated by previous studies (c.f. Burnside and Dollar 
2000, 2004), it may be necessary to hold off on the delivery of assistance until serious political 
reform has already taken place.  The dynamics of political processes in the target states should 
also be considered.  Democratic leaders beyond their first term in power may be better assisted 
with another type of friendly foreign policy tool rather than foreign aid.  
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1
 To the author‟s knowledge only one published study exists which directly investigates aid‟s impact on leader 
survival (Kono and Montinola 2009).  That study applies a straightforward extension of Bueno de Mesquita et al‟s 
(2003) selectorate theory, without accounting for over-time processes as I do here.       
2
 For the sake of style, I vary my terminology about institutions.  Throughout I will use the terms democratic and 
large winning coalition systems interchangeably.  Similarly, I utilize the terms nondemocratic, autocratic, small 
winning coalition and authoritarian to refer to the same concept.   
3
 This figure is reported in constant 2000 US dollars adjusted for inflation. 
5
 Dubin and Rivers (1989) give the censored probit likelihood function as the following: 
 
6
 The baseline survival function estimated from the data using a Cox model with specification identical to the 
outcome equation estimated below produces the function pictured in Figure A1 in the appendix of supplementary 
materials.  The reader should note that it is a relatively smooth function, with steep initial decline which diminishes.  
The logarithmic function is very similar.  For those still concerned that the function is too simple to capture duration 
dependence, the results have also been estimated using a cubic polynomial.  These regression results are available 
upon request.  All key relationships are robust to this alteration in specification.  .     
7
 This is actually the constituent term for aid.  To assist readers in interpretation, I have labeled variables by the 
population to which they refer.   
8




Where the subscript “s” indicates the selection equation and “o” indicates the outcome equation; ρ is the correlation 
between the errors of the two equations.   
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Table 1. Probit Regression of Winning Coalition Failure, Including Non-Aid Recipients 
Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning Coalition Systems 
0.2895*** 
(0.0837) 




Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning Coalition Systems 
-0.6358*** 
(0.1226) 










Lagged Economic Growth 
-0.6774*** 
(0.2484) 
Lagged Log of Total Trade 
-0.0126 
(0.0186) 



















Wald χ2 246.89 
Percent Correctly Classified 90.85% 
NOTE: N=4752 leader years from 1960-2001, including 791 separate leaders.  Robust standard errors, in 
parentheses, are clustered on leaders.  .  In this specification one unit was added to aid/GDP before taking the 
natural log to avoid dropping zeros.  
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2. Censored Probit of Aid Allocation and Winning Coalition Failure 
 Winning Coalition 
Failure 
Aid Allocation 











































Lagged Aid Receipt  
5.0045*** 
(0.4120) 
Lagged Population Growth  
0.0707*** 
(0.0224) 
Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States  
0.1123 
(0.0880) 
Natural log of Population  
-0.6978*** 
(0.1642) 
Lagged Economic Growth  
-0.8590* 
(0.4769) 
Winning Coalition Size  
0.6229** 
(0.2490) 
Former Colony   
0.6770*** 
(0.2159) 





Potential for Oil Production   
-0.8214** 
(0.3898) 
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 test of independent equations 8.10*** 
Note:  Total N=4,692 leader years of 791 separate leaders, 543 observations censored at selection stage. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia not reported in winning coalition failure equation. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Censored Probit of Winning Coalition Failure and Aid Allocation Sub-Sample 
Analysis by Era 




















Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Small 















Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Big 







Big Wining Coalition 
0.2055 
(0.1370) 
 --  
































Probability of Leader‟s Winning 
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Table 3 Continued 
    
































Defensive or Offensive alliance with 






















-2Log Pseudolikelihood -917.6867 -448.4125 
Wald χ
2








 test of independent equations 5.23** 0.41 
NOTE:  Cold War refers to 1960-1988; New World Order to 1989-2001.  Cold War N= 3,176 leader years with 
516 individual leaders and 332 observations censored at the allocation stage.  For New Age N=1,516 leader years 
with 382 individual leaders and 211 observations censored at allocation stage. Robust standard errors, in 
parentheses, are clustered on leaders. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia not reported in the coalition failure equations.  Due to disproportionately small 
numbers of small winning coalition countries receiving aid in the New Age, the reference category was switched in 
that model to ease estimation.  Rather than Logged aid being interacted with an indicator for big winning coalitions 
it is interacted with an indicator for small winning coalition systems. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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NOTE:  Statistics calculated using coefficient estimates reported in Table 1.
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NOTE:  Statistic is mean prediction from 100 simulations at each level of baseline risk
using a draw of 100 beta coefficients from the variance-covariance matrix of the censored
probit reported in Table ##. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2. Probability of Aid Allocation
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NOTE: Reported Statistic is the mean of 10,000 draws from the variance-covariance matrix of the
censored probit reported in Table##.  Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  Democratic
leaders defined by W scores greater or equal to .75; nondemocratic leaders, by W scores below .75.
Dashed vertical line markst the 50% mark in the distribution of failure times for leader type. Note
that the Y-axis scales are not equivalent across panels.
Fig.3 Change in Probability of Failure, Given
Drop from One Standard Deviation Above to the Mean of Aid
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Appendix I:  Supplementary Materials 
 
Table A1. Probit Regression of Aid Allocation 




Lagged Aid Receipt 
4.5245*** 
(0.3559) 
Lagged Population Growth 
0.0627*** 
(0.0216) 
Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States 
-0.5806*** 
(0.1413) 
Natural log of Population 
0.0702 
(0.0769) 
Lagged Economic Growth 
-0.4455 
(0.7901) 
Winning Coalition Size 
-0.7961* 
(0.4556) 
Former Colony  
0.4915** 
(0.2162) 
Defensive or Offensive alliance with an 
OECD donor state  
0.4602** 
(0.2020) 
Potential for Oil Production  
-0.6985** 
(0.3299) 






Pseudo R2 .8413 
-2 Pseudologlikelihood -267.945 
Wald χ2 339.30 
Percent Correctly Classified 98.21% 
NOTE:  N=4,752 leader years from 1960-2001 including 791 individual leaders. Robust standard errors, in 
parentheses, are clustered on leaders. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A2. Censored Probit of Winning Coalition Failure and Aid Allocation using Polity 
Dummy for Regime Type 
 Winning Coalition 
Failure 
Aid Allocation 









































Lagged Aid Receipt  
4.9624*** 
(0.3800) 
Lagged Population Growth  
0.0815*** 
(0.0289) 
Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States  
0.1138 
(0.0828) 
Natural log of Population  
-0.6336*** 
(0.1465) 
Lagged Economic Growth  
0.0006 
(0.0319) 
Winning Coalition Size  
0.5867** 
(0.2356) 
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Defensive or Offensive alliance with an OECD 



















 test of independent equations 12.50*** 
NOTE: N=4947 leader years from 1960-2001 including 820 individual leaders, with 585 censored at the allocation 
stage. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia not 
reported in failure equation. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on leaders. 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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